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Sutmmary  findings
Administrative  exchange  allocation has been  common  in  effects  on exporters of foreign  exchange  shortages,
developing  countries,  especially  in Sub-Saharan  Africa.  reduce the implicit  export tax, and fund a legal private
Steps  to dismantle  or modify  these control mechanisms  exchange  market. But the retained  funds must be
have  been carried  out through transitional  schemes.  La  saleable,  the retention rates substantial,  and traditional
Ferrara,  Castillo,  and Nash draw lessons  from Sub-  exports must be included  to adequately  fund the legal
Saharan  Africa's  historical  experience  useful  both to  private  exchange  market.
African  and former socialist  economies:  Open  general  licensing  (OGL)  and similar  schemes  can
- Exchange  regime  reform should be given highest  be a useful  intermediaze  step in liberalizing  import and
priority  for its role in reducing  anti-export bias.  exchange  allocation  regimes.  But in practice  the benefits
Although  many Sub-Saharan  countries  have attempted  to  are limited by two features.  First,  consumer  goods
reform  their allocation mechanisms,  only a few  have  competing  with local production,  whose imports  were
made  the transition  to market allocation  (virtually  restricted  the most, have  usually  been  excluded,  at least
convertible  currency,  at least on the current account).  initially.  Moreover, OGL  has no endogenous  price-
Failure  to do so is the major shortcoming  of most  setting mechanism  for the exchange  rate. The OGL rate
adjustment  packages.  should generally  be connected  to, but lower than, the
- Both gradual and rapid approaches  have succeeded.  parallel  rate.
On purely economic  grounds (given  the problems  of such  An auction incorporates  a pricing  mechanism,  which is
intermediate  steps  as auctiors), speed  is preferable  but it  an important advantage.  But the pricing  mechanism  must
is not always  politically  or institutionally  feasible.  be allowed  to work, which has not always  been  the case.
- The transition  must  be accompanied  by a coherent  set  Auction  rules should be clear (should  not allow
of fiscal  and monetary  policies  and a willingness  to allow  discretionary  disqualification  of bids, for example),
the exchange  rate  to seek  a true market-clearing  level.  should minimize  participation  costs,  and allow  wide
Some lessons  regarding  the specific  mechanisms,  participation.  Marginal,  rather than the more common
discussed  in approximate  order of their proximity  to  Dutch,  pricing system  is preferred.  The use of a
convertibility,  are as follows:  reservation  price may  reduce volatility  but may also
The most rudimentary  transition  mechanism  is the  impede  the full disbursement  of funds.
own-funds  scheme,  which is no more  than a beginning  of  The shortcomings  of transitional  schemes  to dismantle
reform. Own-funds  schemes  should be accompanied  by  or modify  foreign  exchange  controls become  more
liberalization  of the rules governing  exports, or illegal  important  the longer  they are in place.  A strong  case  can
exports and the black  market  premium  may increase.  be made  for avoiding  delay  in moving  to full currency
Export  retention  schemes  can minimize  the adverse  convertibility.
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organizations.1.  Introduction
Foreign exchange management  is central to the plocess of trade liberalization, and of structural
adjustment  in general. Commercial  policy  measures  such as interventions  on tariffs and non-tariff  barriers
may appear to have a more visible impact on the trade system  per  se,  but exchange rate policy and
allocation mechanisms  affecting the availability  of foreign currency to economic  agents play at least an
equally important  role in shaping the structure of incentives.
Administrative  exchange allocatiun has been used in developing  countries, and in Sub-Saharan
Africa in particular, because  it is the most direct and quickest  means  of dealing  with balance  of payments
crises, of indirectly taxing disfavored  sectors (especialiy  exports), and of channelling crucial imports
toward uses the government considers high priority. However, it is now generally recognized that
exchange management  has had a number of adverse economic  effects, and most structural adjustment
programs have  included  steps to dismantle  or at least modify  these  direct control  mechanisms.  These  steps
have been carried out through a number of transitional  mcchanisms.
These transitional  exchange allocation mechanisms  have seldom been discussed in an analytical
framework,  and never in an integrated  fashion. Yel, failure to account  for interactions  has created  design
and implementation  problems  in some countries.  Numerous  studies  have been  conducted  on exchange  rate
policies and exchange rate regimes in Africa, among  which are Dornbusch  (1984), May (1985), Gulbati
et al. (1986), and Pinto and van Wijnbergen  (1986). Most of thern examine  the nature and consequencesof foreign exchange  controls  per se (such as the distortionary  effects  of multiple  rate practices  and parallel
markets)  and the options  that could  help  cope with these shortcomings,  rather than the transitional  policies
designed  to move to new exchange regimes.
To date,  the only comprehensive  review of the attempts at transition to  floating regimes in
developing countries has been done by Quirk et al. (1987). Their paper describes both the form of
exchange market arrangements and the problems that have arisen in the implementation of  such
arrangements,  an approach which is common  to the present analysis.  It differs from the present, though,
in at least two respects. First, and most significant, Quirk et al. are only concemed with market-
determined  exchange  rate systems  (e.g., auctions  and interbank  markets),  which have generally  been  used
only in the late stages of reform. They do not deal with other schemes which play an important  role in
earlier stages of transition  in foreign  exchange  allocation, like  own-funds,  Open General  Licensing  (OGL)
and export retention  schemes. Second, the coverage of the two studies is different, both for the countries
examined  (developing  countries in Quirk, et. al., SSA countries in the current study) and for the period
under consideration  (until 1986  in Quirk et al., up to 1993  in the present analysis).  Others, like Krumm
(1985), Aron and  Elbadawi (1993), and Feldman and Mehra (1993) have focused on the specific
mechanism  of exchange  auctions,  and conducted  an in-depth  analysis  of design  and implementation  issues.
The goals of this paper are several-fold.  The first is to clarify the meaning of the terms used to
describe the different transitional  mechanisms  and the role each intended to play in the transition. This
is not a trivial task, as some terms have been used to describe different things. A second is to analyze
inter-actions  among  the various mechanisms  themselves  and with other policy  reforms. A final objective
is to  examine the historical experience of SSA countries with these mechanisms, with the goal of
synthesizing  theory and experience  to draw lessons  for the future. Such lessons should have value not
only for the African countries which have yet to complete, or begin, the transition, but also for the
former socialist economies  for whom problems  with exchange  allocation  are major obstacles  to reform.
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The remainder  of this paper is divided into five sections. Section  2 briefly sketches the situation
of a stylized SSA country at the beginning  of the 1980s,  describing  the typical  controls on the exchange
system that were in place and their effects. The descr;ption  of the problems that plagued the pre-reform
regimes serves as the basis for  evaluating the reform measures. SectioiL  3 describes the various
transitional  mechanisms  and explain  their intended  function  and role in the transition. Section  4 describes
a partial equilibrium  analytical  framework  within which several schemes  can be analyzed,  and uses it to
draw implications.  Section  5 examines  evidence  of the interactions  among  these  mechanisms  and between
them and other policies and relates this to the predictions  of the theoretical  modeis of section  4. Section
6 evaluates  how far SSA countries  have gone in the movement  towards convertibility.  By comparing  the
experience of "successful and "unsuccessful"  reformers, the section provides some general guidelines
on the patterns of reform. Section 7 summarizes  and concludes  the paper.
2.  Initial conditions
In the late 1970s or early  1980s, most of the SSA countries were saddled with diverse and
widespread  foreign  exchange  controls.' Three main kinds of controls  deserve  particular  attention for their
effects on the allocation  of foreign exchange:  those on the exchange  rate, those on the import licensing
system, and controls  on export proceeds.
The exchange rate regime of a SSA country at the beginning of the 1980s typically had a dual
nature. The official  exchange rate was pegged  to a basket  or to the currency of the main trading partner
and applied to debt service payments, official current account transactions and essential imports (e.g.
petroleum and other inputs with significant  supply-side  effects, plus certain food imports); all the other
transactions  (private capital and most commnercial  transactions)  had to be financed  on the parallel market
(legal or not), where the exchange rate was floating and considerably  more depreciated than the fixed
-3 -official rate. This premium on the sale of foreign currency on the parallel market was both a signal  and
a cause -f major distortions  in the economy. It was kept high by demand for exchange  that could not be
satisfied  in the official  market, demand  both for importing  goods  and services  and exporting  capital  (often
in the expectation  of imminent  depreciation).  The persistent  overvaluation  of the real exchange  rate led
to increasing importance  of black market activities. More and more exporters chose to smuggle their
products instead of going through official  channels, thus lowering  the amount of foreign exchange  that
the authorities  could  allocate to import  licenses  and fueling  the demand  for smuggled  imports. Sometimes
the use of multiple  official  exchange  rates resulted in a differentiated  exchange rate structure for several
types of commercial transactions. Such "exotic arrangements" 2 illustrate a common feature of SSA
economic  systems: the use of the exchange rate as a substitute  for a structure of taxes and subsidies.
The underpriced  official foreign exchange  was allocated  to importers  through a system of import
licenses  issued  by the Ministry of Commerce  to individual  importers for specific categories  of products.
Once he obtained the license, the importer was usually entitled to purchase the necessary foreign
exchange from the Central Bank or from,  authorized  banks, though the authorization was not always
automatic. The incentive for rent-seeking  activities  connected  with such a discretionary  system was of
course extremely high, since the import quota rent augmnented  the subsidy implicit in obtaining  foreign
currency at an overvalued  exchange  rate. The system  also gave a non-transparent  and unpredictable  level
of protection to domestic producers, since competing  goods were assigned lowest priority for foreign
exchange  allocation.
In addition to the implicit subsidy to importers, an implicit tax on exporters and on workers'
remittances  from abroad was generally levied in the form of surrender requirements  for their proceeds. 3
Exporters  were required  to repatriate  the proceeds  from their exports within  a certain  period from the date
of shipment and sell them to the Central Bank (or to authorized commercial banks) at the official
exchange rate; a similar requirement  applied to payments  for invisibles.
-4  -Several interrelated  problems  arose from this complex  foreign  exchange  allocation  system. Foreign
exchange shortages led to rationing and restrained imports, thus creating bottlenecks  in the production
process and shortages and high prices for consumer goods. The whole system protected inefficient
domestic production of import substitutes, thereby imposing  a strong anti-export bias which diverted
resources away from the export sectors and undermined  the prospects for increasing foreign exchange
earnings in the future. In particular, the exchange licensing, import controls, and tariffs provided
multiple, often redundant, layers of protection. The importance  of unofficial  parallel markets implied  a
loss of control by the govermnent  on the bulk of economic  activity and, related to this, a loss in fiscal
revenue.  Moreover, the persistent overvaluation  of the domestic currency and consequent chronic
expectation  of devaluation  encouraged  capitnl  flight, reducing  savings, investment,  and growth. Last, the
lack of transparency and the high degree of discretion in the system encouraged rent seeking activities
and corrupt practices.
The incidence  of these problems  varied of course across countries  and over tirne, but it is clear that
the foreign exchange  allocation  system of a typical SSA  courtry at the beginning  of the 1980s "imposed
heavy costs in terms of distortions in resource  allocation  and unequal access by various socio-economic
groups". 4 This was inconsistent  with the goal of trade policy reform and structural adjustment. The
recognition  of such shortcomings  induced  a number  of SSA  governments  to adopt  reform programs  which
were intended  to eventually  lead to market allocation  of foreign  exchange,  and usually  to floating  regimes,
as steps towards  ultimately  making  the currency  convert:ble.  The transition  to a more liberalized  system
was usually carried out through a combination  of allocation  mechanisms. The rest of the paper focuses
on the most commonly  used of these transitional  mechanisms.
-5-3.  Transitional foreign exchange allocation mechanisms: description and rationale
Transitional  foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanisms  were present in adjustment  programs as cells
of a complex matrix rather than "self-contained"  schemes. Here, though, we abstract to a certain  degree
from institutional  complexity  and isolate each mechanism  for analytical  purposes. Each sub-secticn  will
describe the f"nctioning  of the relevant scheme  in a typical SSA country  and provide  the rationale  for its
use. An assessment  of the main effects  of several of these mechanisms  are derived in a basic analytical
framework in section  4.
The order in which the various schemes  are presented reflects the phases of the transition, with
a shift in emphasis  from mechanisms  which only deal with allocating  foreign exchange, where the price
is set  outside the mechanism itself, to  schemes in  which the allocation and the price-setting are
endogenous. While the introduction  of own-funds,  open general licensing and export retention schemes
do not require any departure from a fixed or multiple foreign exchange system, the establishment  of
auctions, legalized foreign exchange  bureaus and interbank  markets do.
3.1  Own-funds  schemes
An own-funds  scheme allows a certain set of goods to be imported without  constraints  as long as
the importer does not require access to official foreign exchange resources. Usually it is embodied in a
so-called "no currency" or own-funds  import  license which is issued  automatically  for items specified  on
a positive list and which does not authorize  the foreign currency necessary  to import them. 5
Most own-funds  schemes  do not require any documentation  from the importer about the source of
his currency. This can translate  into an implicit  incentive  to use black  market foreign  exchange, although
legal remittances  and retained  funds  from exports (when  allowed)  could in principle  serve to finance  such
imports.  Own-funds  schemes,  while  increasing  welfare, may also paradoxically  increase  the black-market
-6  -premium. as well as unofficial transfers from abroad, illegal exports and over and under-invoicing
practices. unless accompanied  by liberalization  on the export side (section  4.1).
Such schemes can cover both intermediate  inputs whose shortage may reduce the utilization of
productive  capacity, and consumer  goods which  play a major role in providing  incenti-es  for production.
In Tanzania. for example, due to the shortage  of some consumer  goods and to their high price relative
to  traditional export earnings,  farmers lacked the  incentives to  produce traditional agricultural
commodities. By increasing  the availability  of these "incentive  goods",  the introduction  of the own-funds
scheme removed a bottleneck not only on the consumption  but also on the produiction  side. Besides
increasing the supply of goods in the country, the own-funds  schemes  have the additional  advantage  of
legalizing imports that are already smuggled  as well as encouraging  the repatriL.tion  of remittances  and
other capital abroad.
Although  these schemes improve the efficiency  of the incentive  structure somewhat,  they are not
supposed  to address the issue of efficient  allocation  of foreign exchange  in geneial nor to reduce the size
of the parallel market. The scope for the use of such schemes as major vehicles towards convertibility
is therefore a priori limited.
3.2  Open general licensing (OGL)
An OGL regime is designed to allocate foreign exchange for importation  of goods or services
specified on a list. according to some automatic  criteria and at an official  exchange  rate. In other words,
for items specified on the list, import licenses and foreign exchange are automatically  provided at a
'subsidized" rate. In most cases funds  have been  provided  by donors (mainly  the World Bank). The OGL
has operationally translated into a mechanism designed to pump foreign exchange into a reforming
economy  with some restrictions  on, but without  allowing  discretionary  determination  of, how the imports
are channeled  or to whom. Since both the quantity and the price of the foreign exchange are fixed in
- 7 -advance, OGL schemes  by definition  involve  rationing.  The rationing  devices  traditionally  used have  been
the eligibility  of goods and the eligibility  of firms.
The liberalization  sequence  typically followed  by SSA countries has been the following: At the
iifitial stage, a  "positive" list of goods that could be imported was specified, mainly spare parts and
essential inputs, but sometimes  also raw materials  and non-competing  consumer  imports.  The second  step
replaces thc "positive"  with a "negative"  list  of goods  that cannot  be imported,  from which list competing
consumner  goods  are gradually deleted. In the third stage, the negative  list is reduced to a bare minimum,
such as goods prohibited  for security  and health concerns.  Finally (but not in all case-s),  service, invisible
and capital transactions are added. The rationed access of firms to the scheme usually has benefitted
priority industries. For example, in Uganda,  the OGL was limited  to firms engaged  in priority industries
within selected subsectors and based on tax revenue, management  capability and access to credit. In
Maiawi  and Tanzania, only "end users" were allowed  into  the OGL facility  to preclude traders  and other
intermediaries  from enjoying  excess profits.
The main rationale  for the introduction  of an OGL scheme  is to allocate foreign  exchange  in a non-
discretionary manner according to  some  well-defined rules.  Besides alleviating production and
consumption  bottlenecks  related to insufficient  import capacity,  such a scheme eliminates  the distortions
brought about by discretionary allocation of import and exchange licenses. In particular, given the
automatic and transparent operation of the system, the scope for rent-seeking  activities is significantly
reduced. A limit  of OGL schemes  is, by definition,  the fact that they do not address the issue of exchange
rate determination,  and thus do not totally eliminate  multiple  rates, rationing, or rents. Therefore, OGL
schemes should be viewed as useful but temporary  mechanisms  in the transition.
- 8 -3.3  Export  retention  schemes
Under an export retention scheme  (ERS), exporters  are allowed  to retain a certain percentage of
their earnings in special foreign  currency  deposit  accounts  at home  or (rarely) abroad. The remainder  of
the earnings must be surrendered  to the government  at  the official  exchange rate. The retained earnings
can be used to import specified goods  or sold at a parallel exchange rate to third parties.
The possibility of retaining export proceeds is usually introduced as an incentive scheme to
compensate  for the general anti-export  bias of the trade system. Exporters have expenses denominated
in foreign currency (freight, insurance, importation  of raw materials), and in many instances  after they
surrender foreign exchange i: is difficult  and costly to get it back. When required to surrender all their
proceeds, exporters  must sell exchange  to the authorities  at the official (overvalued)  exchange rate and
then resort to the parallel market to finance  their imports, thus paying an implicit  export tax equal to the
black market premium. But even when  all the foreign  exchange  needed can be obtained without  resorting
to the parallel market, the process of exchangi.g export receipts in local currency (at the bank's buying
rate) and then purchasing foreign currency again (at the selling rate) would cause them to incur the
foreign  exchange  differential  and additional  transaction  costs. Even  in a well-functioning  exchange  system
like Mauritius, this spread has been estimated  to add around 2-3 percent to exporters' currency costs
(Hachette, et. al.).  All this clearly taxes the export sector. Over time, the intrinsic value of the ERS
incentive  for exporters automatically  declines as reform closes the gap between  the parallel and official
exchange  rates.
The ERS has three beneficial  effects. One is to insulate exporters  from problems in the exchange
allocation system so they can readily import for their own needs. The second is (when the retained
earnings are transferable)  to give an implicit subsidy to exporters, or reduce the implicit tax from the
overvalued rate . The third is to provide  a source of supply for a legal private exchange market.
-9-Several features in the design of a retention  scheme affect its coverage and effectiveness. First,
the percentage  of retention  allowed has varied from 2 or 5 percent to 100  percent, according to the kind
of exports involved  and to the stage of reform  of the country. In general,  higher ratios have been  allowed
for nontraditional  exports than for traditional  oines,  and for later stages of reform. Second, the eligibility
of exporters may depend on the kind of goods exported as well as on the size of the firrn and other
criteria (e.g., the percentage  of domestic value added, in Kenya). Once again, the tendency is to favor
nontraditional  and large exporters over traditional and small-scale  ones. Small or occasional  exporters
may prefer to smuggle  in order to avoid transactions  costs of official  channels.
Third, the foreign exchange retained may or may not be saleable. In some cases, exporters are
required to use the amounts  retained  for the importation  of raw materials  and spare parts essential  to their
production activity (e.g.,  Tanzania). In case the foreign exchange retained is saleable (e.g.,  Kenya,
Uganda), a relevant feature of the scheme is the exchange  rate at which it can be sold. Generally, this
rate is a free market rate or at least a rate not as overvalued  as the official  rate. In this case, the scheme
reduces the implicit tax on exports in proportion  to the percentage  of earnings  allowed to be retained.
Last, limits may be placed upon the date of surrender and the period within which the foreign
exchange retained can be used or sold. These limits are intended to prevent speculative holding of
exchange, though it is not clear that they have been productive or effective in meeting this goal. For
example, in Zamnbia  a retention  period limit of 21 days was in effect in 1984. This was expanded to 60
days in 1987  to 180  days by 1992.
3.4  Foreign  exchange  auctons
Under an auction regime, the available  amount  of foreign  exchange  is allocated  by the cenitral  bank
through a bidding process. A numter of different institutional  settings can be encompassed  under such
a definition.  Nonetheless,  most auctions  in SSA seem  to be conducted  according  to the following  scheme.
- 10  -The central  bank decides the amount of foreign exchange  to be auctioned, and in some cases sets
a minimum  reserve price. Participants  submit  bids indicating  the amount  requested  and the price they are
willing to pay. 6 The submission of bids usually requires an advance deposit of domestic currency,
covering  part or all of the foreign  exchange  requested.  The central bank then ranks the hids by price and,
beginning  with the highest, awards the amount bid to each bidder  until the available  supply is exhausted.
Each bidder pays the price of his own bid if the auction  is of the "Dutch" type, while all pay the market
clearing  price (that is the lowest  price among  successful  bids) in the "marginal  price" system. The market
clearing price becomes the official market exchange  rate and applies to all transactions until the next
auction. 7 The market exchange rate, the number of bids and the number of successful bidders are
announced  after the auction. Auctions  may be held weekly or fortnightly.
Two kinds of auctions can be distinguished,  according to the nature of the participants.  In a
wholesale  auction, the participants  are commercial  banks and authorized  dealers, who then sell onward
to importers; in a retail auction. foreign exchange  is sold directly to importers.
An auction system addresses  many of the problems outlined in section 2. First of all (to varying
degrees, depending  on the institutional  rules), it allows the interaction between demand and supply of
foreign exchange, thus moving towards a market system and providing  gains in terms of allocative
efficiency. If  appropriately run,  it cannot create queues, as an  OGL system, since the price  is
endogenously  determined. Second, by leading to a de facto devaluation,  the introduction  of an auction
regime shouid lower the spread between the official  and the parallel rates. If the auction rate applies to
a sufficiently  wide range of transactions  -and in particular to the purchase  of export proceeds- the anti-
export bias would  be consequently  reduced.  Third, some features  like the publication  of the price, number
and size of the bids  make an auction  a transparent  system which  discourages  rent-seeking  and corruption.
- 11  -3.5  Foreign  exchange  bureaus
Foreign exchange bureaus are institutions that purchase and  sell foreign exchange at  rates
established by themselves. Such bureaus have (legally  or not) always been part of the parallel market,
but only recently  have been legalized  by some SSA countries.  It is therefore the legalization  of bureaus,
not their mere existence, that constitutes  a step towards a more liberalized  foreign exchange  system. 8
The sources of the foreign exchange sold by bureaus are mostly private: remittances (when
allowed) and retained  export proceeds (when saleable). In principle, however, bureaus can be allowed
to bid at the auctions, so even auction funds can be channeled  through foreign exchange bureaus.
Compared  to other allocation  mechanisms,  the main feature of the bureau system is the flexibility
and simplicity  of procedures  with which it operates. Documentation  requirements  for buyers are minimal
and, even when full coverage in local currency is required for an import or exchange license (e.g.,
Uganda), the delay receiving foreign  exchange  is much less than in the "official"  market. Requirements
for access  to official  markets tend to impose "fixed"  costs. Large importers  can amortize  these costs over
larger volumes,  and thus have some advantage  in procuring  exchange  through these channels.  Therefore,
small and medium  or occasional  importers constitute  the main clients of the bureaus, even though they
pay a higher price.
The rationale  for the official  recognition  of foreign  exchange  bureaus is to legalize  at least a portion
of the parallel market, thus bringing  under control part of the informal  sector and laying  the foundations
for exchange  rate unification.  Moreover, the entrance  of bureaus into the market brings competition  and
efficiency and potentially creates a thick and non-volatile market if a  sufficient amount of foreign
exchange is channeled  through this system. In the experience  of most SSA countries, the bureaus' rate
has generally  proved to be stable (see Aron and Elbadawi).
- 12  -3.6  Interbanrc  markets
A further final step towards convertibility  is the establishment  of an interbank market. In an
interbank market wholesale participants  are the conunercial  banks and the authorized  foreign exchange
dealers (e.g., bureaus), who trade foreign  exchange  among  themselves  and with the general public. The
exchange  rate is determined in transactions  between  the banks (and dealers) and in negotiations  between
the banks and their clients, and is therefore free to vary. Periodic fixing  sessions  are held with the central
bank participating, during which the "official" rate is established based on the previous transactions
amorng  the private buyers and sellers.
Although  interbank  systems  are relatively  unregulated  compared  to other allocation  schemes,  some
prudential regulation  is usually set. Limits on stocks (maximum  amount of foreign exchange  held) and
on flows (maximum  volume of foreign  exchange  surrendered  per period to each conunercial  bank) have
often been imposed  to prevent major dealers from cornering  the market and to avoid large exposure to
risk.
In principle, in a pure interbank  system all the supply and the demand  for foreign exchange  should
be channeled  through the market. In some SSA countries, though, partial surrender requirements  still
remain and some portion of the exchange  supplied  is allocated  outside  the market, with the govermnent
often having  guaranteed access to foreign exchange  for its own use. Even in such cases, however, the
exchange rate applied to all transactions  should be the same.
An interbank  market seems to provide a solution  for most of the problems outlined in section 2.
Foreign exchange is allocated through the price mechanism  in an efficient manner; its availability  for
import necessities is increased and the degree of anti-export  bias implicit in fixed overvalued exchange
rate regimes is significantly reduced or eliminated, since the interbank system is actually a floating
regime. Besides  providing  more uniform  incentives,  such a system  virtually  eliminates  the spread between
the official and the parallel rate and hence reduces the scope for black market activities. Finally, the
- 13-determination  of the exchange rate is removed  from the political arena, which is in general desirable in
SSA countries where inappropriate  interventions  have  caused serious  distortions  in the economic  system.
The movement  to a decentralized  market system should not translate,  however, into disregard of
the development priorities of the government. Accompanying policies should therefore assure its
compatibility  with the medium and long term development  prospects of the country.
4.  Simple analytics of allocation mechanisms
Some of the effects of different mechanisms,  as well as their interactions  with each other, can be
illustrated  in a partial equilibrium  framework,  similar in some respects  to that used by Dornbusch  (1974)
and developed by de Rosa (1992) for own-funds  schemes.
4.1  Own-Funds
First consider a  small economy with  no capital flows that  produces and  consumes three
commodities:  importables,  exportables,  and nontraded  goods. Monetary  and fiscal policy variables are
assumed as given, and imports are assumed equal to exports.  The unrestricted demand for foreign
exchange (imports) is shown as DD in figure 3.1, while the unrestricted supply of foreign exchange
(exports) is SS.
The pre-reform situation  of a typical  SSA  country can be represented  by the presence  of an import
quota (M=Md) not strictly enforced, so that the level of imports  can be increased beyond M. through
smuggling, although  at increasing  marginal  costs.  Exporters are required ,  'ui7ender proceeds  at the
official rate PO,  so the supply  of legal exports is XO.  Exporters  can illegally  export more, but, like import
smuggling,  only at increasing  marginal  costs. The effective import and export  curves are therefore DD
and SS,  whose slopes are greater in absolute  terms the more rapidly increasing  are the marginal costs
- 14-of smuggling  imports  and exports respectively. The illegal  imports  M, - Mo  are financed  through foreign
exchange earned by  export smugglers at  the real parallel exchange rate  P,  which is  above the
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Figure 3.1  Effects of Own-Funds Scheme
Suppose  now  unlimited  imports  are legalized  under an own-funds  facility. This eliminates  the extra
costs of increasing import demand beyond  Mo: the relevant demand schedule  becomes  DD.  However,
export supply is still represented by SY if smuggling  costs for exports are not reduced.  The quantity
M 2 is now legally imported, while X2-X, constitutes  unofficial  exports.  Both the real parallel exchange
rate (now P 2) and the parallel premium (now P2/e 0) rise in order to provide an incentive  for increased
export production  to meet the greater demand. In terms of welfare effects, though, the new equilibrium
is preferable  to the previous  one. Imports  are increased  and the  deadweight  loss  associated  with protection
is reduced from the area BCAE to the triangle BDE.  This is one of de Rosa's basic results.  Thus,
- 15 -paradoxically, an increased black market premium is associated with an improvement  in welfare in the
import-export  market.
For mnany  reasons, however, it is desirable to reduce the black-market premium.  Any policy
measures  that increase  the supply, or the elasticity  of supply, of exports could do this.  A partial export
retention  scheme, for example, could shift the "illegal  section"  of the supply curve to the right, making
the effective supply SS" and reducing the black market premium to P31eo,  and reducing the welfare loss
as well.
4.2  Auctons and parallel markets: price and premium  determination  and unification  issues
Suppose there is an auction market operating simultaneously  with a private market. The auction
is funded through exogenously  determined donor contributions to the government. The auction has
available Q* (=  Q, - Q 3 in figures 3.2 and 3.3) of foreign exchange each period.  Buying from the
auction costs more than buying from the private market; the extra cost may be in the form of paperwork
requirements,  fees, or increased probability  of detection  of illegal  activity (tax evasion). We denote by
e the official marginal  auction price of foreign exchange and by P the price on the private market.  In
this discussion, we abstract from the various issues revolving  around the effects of the auction rules on
the strategic  behavior of bidders.  We assume bidders bid according to their true marginal valuation  of
the foreign exchange, so the auction equilibrium  is essentially  a competitive  market equilibrium.
To begin with, suppose  that all buyers in the auction (but not the private market) incur the same
cost, C*, of buying from the auction instead  of the private market, and that the auction  has a reservation
price of forex eR. If the total demand for foreign  exchange  is DD, then the demand  in the private market
would look like DdO  in figure 3.2.  There would be a kink at P, (= eR + C*); at this price in the private
market. demand would shift to the auction.  How the total demand is divided between the two markets
depends on the supply schedule  in the private market. If the supply is like S,S,, there will be no demand
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Figure 3.2  Effects of Auction; homogeneous  cost
for auction funds; if the supply is like S 2S 2, the auction funds will be partially used (Q,  - Q 2 will be
funded in the auction). if the supply is like S 3S.,  the auction funds  will be fully disbursed. Assuingi the
last case, the total cost of using the auction is the rectangle ABCZD  (=  C* *  Q*).  In this model, the
premiium  of the private market rate over the auction rate is always C*, provided only that the demand
for auction funds is positive.
Now suppose  that the buyers are not homogeneous  with respect to their cost of using the auction.
cr example, in Uganda. participation  in the auction requires  a letter of credit (LC).  If this is the only
reason for opening an LC. the auction imposes an extra cost.  But for those importers who get other
benefits from an LC, the marginal cost of using the auction is not as high as it is for the others.
Alternatively,  suppose  (as is true in Uganda)  that documentation  from the auction is also used to assess
import  tariffs, so that tariff evasion  is much harder when imports  are effected  using auction funds. Then
- 17  -the full cost of using the auction will be higher for importers  of high-tariff  goods than for those of low-
tariff goods.
In either of these cases, the private market demand would look like DD* in figure 3.3.  At any
price over e,  some buyers will switch to the auction.  Importers  of low-tariff items will be the first to
switch. The higher the private market price, the larger the number  of buyers  who will find it worthwhile
to switch. At price P,, enough  buyers would be using the auction  to exhaust  its funds. At higher  prices,
the private market demand has the same slope as the total demand DD.
The price of foreign  exchange  in the private market is determined  by the intersection  of the private
supply schedule and the private market demand (DD' in figure 3.2 or DD*  in figure 3.3). The market-
clearing auction rate is the private price ninus the marginal cost of using the auction.  In the case of
constant marginal  cost C* (figure 3.2), the auction  price is always the private price minus C*; in other
words, the premium is constant and equal to C*.  In the case of rising marginal cost (figure 3.3), the
premium is larger under conditions  that cause more auction funds to be disbursed, but only up to the
point  at which auction  funds are fully disbursed. In figure 3.3, if supply is S 2S2, the private  market price
is P,  *, while  the auction price is still at the reservation  price eR. If auction  funds are just fully disbursed
(i.e., the quantity supplied in the private market is exactly Q2), the private market price is P 3., and the
auction price still eR,  so the premium is C.  But if the private market supply  is such that there is excess
demand for auction funds (e.g., private supply is S3S,), the auction price is above the reservation  price
eR. In this case, the auction price is less than the private price (P*) by the premium C,  no matter what
the level of the private price.
Assuming  the auction  funds  are fully  used, the total cost of using the auction is the area EFI (which
is equal to the area EGI, since these are two triangles with identical  base and height. If the cost of using
the auction is "transaction  cost", then this area is a real economic  cost.  If the cost is only payment of
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Figure 3.3  Effects of Auction; heterogeneous costs
Several conclusions  can be drawn from this simple model:
*  In both figures, if the auction  funds  are fully  used (supply  vis a vis demand is like  S3S3), then small
perturbations  in supply or demand  would cause the private market exchange  rate and the auction
rate to move together.  The premium would not change.  The private market price will be P*
The auction price will be equal to (P*-C*)  in figure 3.2 or (P*-C')  in figure 3.3, depending  on
whether  the marginal  cost of using  the auction  is constant  or rises with the amount  of auction  funds
used.
*  If the auction funds  are n  fully used (e.g., if supply is S2Sa),  then small perturbations  will cause
the premium  (and private market rate) to change in figure 3.3 (but not in 3.2), but the auction  rate
will not change in either figure.
*  The level of the reservation  price determines  the vertical  position  (but not the slope) of the segment
- 19  -of the private demand schedule  that lies between  Q, and Q3. Suppose  that supply in the private
market is stochastic.  Then, the higher is the reservation price in the auction market, the less
frequently  will the auction funds be fully  used.  That is, the less often will the quantity traded in
the private market be less than Q3. This means that the auction and the private market rates will
move  together (which happens  only when the equilibrium  Q is less than Q 3) less frequently, so the
premium becomes  more volatile  in the case of heterogeneous  costs. It also means  that the average
price of foreign exchange  increases in both the auction and private markets.
*  If the reservation price is set high enough to  have an effect,  it will interfere with the full
disbursement  of the auction funds.
*  If the auction funds are fully disbursed (i.e., the supply-demand  conditions  in the private market
are as depicted  by S3S3), unifying  the auction (or an OGL) and the private market by channeling
auction funds through the private market would imply  unification  of the rate at the private market
rate prevailing  before the unification. Both supply and demand would shift by the same amount
(Q*).  If, however, auction funds are only partially disbursed (i.e., supply relative to demand is
like S2S2), the supply will increase by Q*, while  demand  will increase  by less (to the total demand
schedule  DD), so the resulting  unified  market exchange  rate is lower than the private rate before.
If supply is like S,S,, the exchange rate would fall even more than in the previous case if the two
markets are unified, since demand would not shift at all.
*  By unifying  the auction and private markets, the goverrunent  will not lose revenue, and probably
will gain.  It is sometimes  feared that eliminating  the official  channel for selling foreign  exchange
will increase tariff evasion  and lose revenue. This result says that even if tariff evasion  increases,
this loss is likely to be more than compensated  by the higher price rece.ved by the government
when it sells foreign exchange. The simplest  way to see this is to assume t,at supply and demand
conditions are such that auction funds are fully, but barely, disbursed.  Then the government's
- 20 -revenue from the auction funds is 1(Q,-Q,)e'J,  while the revenue from tariffs that would be lost
were the funds not channeled  through the auction is EFI  (=EGI).  Now suppose  the markets are
unified. The previous result shows  that since  private market demand  and supply each shift by (Q,-
Q),  the unified exchange rate would be the same as the pre-unification  private rate, P 3. The
government's revenue  from selling  through the unified  market would  therefore be ((Q,-Q 3)P 3J, the
area EGHI. The extra revenue from selling  at a higher rate exceeds  the lost tariff revenue by the
area GHI.  This is an even stronger claim than that made by Collier and Gunning, who pointed
out that unification  would not reduce revertt;.a'
4.3  Pricing issues in open general  licensing and parallel markets9
In operating an OGL, the question  arises of what should be the price of foreign exchange in this
market.  (In auctions, a reservation price may or may not be used, but if it is, the question of the
appropriate  level arises here, too.)  In some countries, the level has been set using the parallel rate as a
target.  This analysis  explains  why this leads to gradually increasing  underdisbursement  of funds.
Suppose  the official  OGL market operates  alongside  a private parallel  market for foreign  exchange.
The OGL market has a fixed amount  of foreign exchange  available  in each session, namely (Q, - Q2) in
figure 3.4, which is disbursed by the central bank according  to the guidelines  established  by donors. We
denote by e the price of foreign  exchange  in the official  market  and by P the price in the parallel (private)
market.  Initiiily, the central bank sets the official OGL rate at eO. For simplicity, assume all buyers
incur the same  relative transactions  cost C* for the use of OGL funds  and thus face the full price PO  (=eO
+ C*). (The analysis  is not changed  by an assumption  that costs  differ among  buyers). The full demand
I  Revenue would not increase with unification  if there is a uniform tariff, leading to a constant
marginal cost of using the auction. All African  countries, however, have a non-uniform  tariff schedule,
so the marginal cost rises.  In this case, government  revenue increases  with unification.
-21  -curve is represented by DD.  The demand for private (parallel)  market funds (excluding  OGL funds) is
DABDI  when the OGL price is e0. The private supply  curve is represented  by SS.  The quantity of OGL
funds disbursed is the difference  between  the quantity demanded  and the quantity  supplied in the private
market. i.e., the difference  between  SS and DD.  In the initial  equilibrium,  this difference  (the length of
segment  AB) is equal to (Q, - Q2), indicating  OGL funds are fully disbursed.
Now assume that the central  bank adopts a new exchange  rate rule:  The OGL rate is set equal to
the parallel market rate prevailing in the previous OGL session (or e, = P,  ). As a result of the new
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Figure 3.4  Effects of open general Ucensing  pricing  rule
In the second period, the OGL rate is e,, the full-price of OGL funds is P,, so net demand for
funds in the private market is DECD.  The quantity  of funds supplied  in the private market is Q 3, while
- 22 -the quantity  (Q 4- Q 3) is funded in the OGL market, leaving  (Q 3 - Q 2) of OGL funds undisbursed. In the
third period, the OGL rate is e2, the full price of OGL fAmds  is P2, and the net demand is equal to the
private supply (Q 5), so there is no demand for OGL funds. Any further increase in the price of OGL
funds has no .. ect.
5.  Foreign exchange allocation mechanisms: experience and policy issues
This section gives -n evaluation  of experience  with these transitional mechanisms.  Effectiveness
depends not only upon the design of each mechanism,  but also upon the consistency  among the various
schemes,  and between  them and other policies.  The policy  issues  arising in the design and implementation
of the various schemes  will be discussed,  with  particular  attention  to the interaction  among  them and with
reference  to the experience  of those African  countries  that best provide an example  of the specific issues.
5.1  Own-funds  facilities
Two key issues should be addressed in evaluating  an own- funds scheme: first, whether it attains
the goal of increasing imports of intermediate  and consumer goods; second, how these imports are
actually financed.
The extent to which the introduction  of an own-funds  facility significantly  increases  the inflow of
imports into the country  depends on how extensive  the eligible list is and how effectively  illegal imports
were suppressed  before. If a fairly large number  of items  are included in the list and if the controls were
previously  strictly enforced, the new scheme constitutes  a significant  step towards trade liberalization.
How much this reduces protection  of import-substituting  domestic production (and the consequent  anti-
export bias)  depends on whether  competing  imported  products  are included. If the list of eligible  products
is relatively inclusive, the own-funds scheme automatically encourages the import of goods whose
- 23 -importation  was most severely restricted,  since it is these goods whose domestic price will exceed their
border price by the greatest  margin. If, on the other hand, the eligible list comprises  n.ainly goods which
were previously  given priority in exchange  allocation, this advantage  is lost.
The own-funds  facility can be useful in bringing  a large segment  of the parallel economy into the
formnal  economy without requiring any additions to the existing  administrative  machinery. This can be
an important  consideration  in a weak institutional  setting.
In Tanzania, during the period 1970-84  (except for the years of the coffee boom in 1976-77),
balance  of payments  problems  induced  the government  to introduce  and gradually  tighten up an elaborate
system of foreign exchange  controls which  gave preference  to the importation  of intermediate  and capital
goods and allocated foreign exchange on a discretionary  basis. This led to high protection, serious
shortages of inputs and spare parts for some of the most efficient firms, and to shortages of consumer
goods, especially  in rural areas, until an own-funds  facility was introduced in 1984.
Import licenses  have since then been issued which allow the importation  of goods specified on a
positive list (mainly consumer  goods like textiles, soap, cooking  oil, and producer goods like building
materials, equipment and vehicles) using unofficial  foreign exchange held by domestic residents. The
official list covers approximately  40 percent of the import categories, although some catch-all phrases
allow discretionary  approval  to import many other items not specifically  included.
The Tanzanian  own-funds  scheme  proved  effective  in providing  access  to imported  goods. Imports
under the scheme  jumped to about 35 percent of total imports  and remained  at that level until 1989, when
the importance  of OGL increased. Total imports  increased  from about US$0.84 billion before the own-
funds scheme to US$1.  19 billion in 1988, though some of the increase was probably due to registration
of previously  existing illegal imports.
The second issue, namely  that of the sources  of "own"  foreign  exchange, links own-funds  schemes
with the other transitional mechanisms.  If the own-funds  facility is not introduced in conjunction  with
-24  -other policy measures increasing legal access to foreign exchange, the reduction in import smuggling
activities may be accompanied by an increase in the importance of parallel markets in the economy
(section 4.1). In particular, if neither a relaxation  of surrender requirements  for export proceeds nor a
liberalization  of the rules governing  remittances is introduced, the only possible sustainable  source of
foreign  exchange flows (excluding the drawing down of existing accumulated  stocks) for additional
imports  under the own-funds  scheme becomes  export smuggling.
Once more, Tanzania  provides an example. When the own-funds  facility was first introduced in
1984, both receipts from invisibles  and export proceeds  had to be surrendered  to a central authority, so
that the need to obtain foreign exchange  actually led to an increase in illegal exports. Table 3.1 shows
an interesting  pattem in official exports of merchandise  goods and of services.  Both tend to decrease
substantially  in the period 1982-87  compared  to the years 1980-81.  Though it is hard to prove cause and
effect, one interpretation  of this is an indication  of underinvoicing  of exports and increase in smuggling
activities.' 0 The black market premium increased during the introduction  and early stages of the own-
funds scheme, as predicted by the model in section  4.1.
Table  3.1:  Tanzania:  exports  and  imports  (1980-90),  millions of U.S.  dollars
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Merchandise
exports,  fob  583  613  413  383  399  328  336  347  386  415  434
Exports  of
total
services  179  196  117  108  107  108  110  102  121  123  140
Merchandise
imports.
fob  1.089  1.061  952  708  760  869  913  1,000  1,033  1.070  1.290
Imports  of
total services  323  284  221  191  264  309  328  420  471  479  481
Black  market
premium  224.0  192.7  204.6  301.3  286.5  259.4  248.0  138.9  100.0  35.2  78.0
Sources:  African Development  Indicators
Pick's Currency Yearbook.  various  issues
- 25 -One implication  is that, in order to avoid increasing  the importance  of parallel markets, own-funds
facilities should be accompanied  by a liberalization  in the rules governing remittances or by export
retention  schemes.  Tanzania, for example, in 1986  began  to allow  nontraditional  exporters  to retain some
of their earnings, 100 percent at first, subsequently  reduced to  50 percent. Accordingly, unofficial
production of nontraditional  crops and handicrafts  increased significantly  (though  from a small base) in
1987," helping at least in a small way to fund the own-funds import. The rise in the black market
premium, however, indicates  that this small measure was not sufficient.
5.2  Open General  Licensing  schemes
The main issue in the design of OGL schemes  is the determination  of the exchange  rate applying  to
imports on the list. Since neither the quantity nor the price of foreign exchange is endogenously
determined  by the scheme, a failure in setting the price that should clear the market (in particular, tioe
choice of an overvalued exchange rate) will result in the formation of queues at the OGL window.
Although  the scheme is not explicitly  designed  for exchange  rate determination,  it p.omptly "signals"  the
necessary changes  in the official rate by showing  excess demand or supply. In the experience of SSA
countries, the liberalization of the OGL list without adequate increases in the foreign exchange and
adjustment  of the exchange rate supplied has often led to chronic excess demand, queues, loss of
credibility, speculative  overimporting,  rapid depletion  of OGL funds, and in some cases, closure of the
OGL facility.  One case in point is Tanzania,  where the unwillingness  of the  authorities  to devalue as often
and as much as necessary  to accommodate  liberalization  of the OGL list has caused the persistence  of
excess demand throughout the reform period. Tanzanian officials, though, blamed the persistence of
excess demand on the speed of OGL liberalization.
Quirk (1989) correctly emphasizes that "exchange rate  or equivalent action on pricing should
accompany  the adoption of such a system". An interesting  exchange  rate rule was used in Madagascar
- 26 -for the Liberalized  Import Regime (LIR), the predecessor  to the OGL. Under conditions  of aggregate
demand in excess of available LIR funds, importers  were "cleared' from the queue in each session by
receiving only their  prorated demand share,  while the nonrefundable application fee  (defined as
percentage of  the funds originally requested) implicitly forced importers to  pay  a  slightly more
depreciated effective exchange rate, even in the absence of official devaluation.' 2 Despite the low
threshold for the devaluation rule, which was triggered only when less than 40 percent of foreign
exchange  demand was met at a session:' 3 sufficient  official devaluation and reduced scope for illegal
activity  account  for the smooth  operation  of the system. The Malagasy  scheme  worked well  until October
1991  when the system collapsed on account of macroeconomic  imbalances  and civilian unrest.
But the need to avoid an overvalued  exchange  rate with an OGL does not imply that the rate should
be set equal to the parallel market rate. Based  on the adverse effects of multiple  rate systems in general,
it might seem  desirable  to equalize  the OGL  and the parallel  rate. This has been done by some countries,
which have informally  used the parallel rate as a guide in setting  the official  rate.'4 However, compared
to the parallel market, significant  transaction  costs are associated  with the use of OGL funds  due both to
administrative  costs (paperwork  costs, commercial  bank fees for the opening of letters of credit, local
coverage requirements)  and to the  opportunity  cost of legal versus illegal activities (the evasion of
customs  duties  being  less likely  under a carefully  monitored  OGL  window).  These transaction  costs imply
that an attempt  to set the price of OGL foreign exchange  too close to the parallel rate can result in less
than full use of OGL funds. As shown in section 4.3,  the parallel market rate minus all relative
transaction  costs sets a ceiling  on the OGL rate.
Setting  the OGL rate is a delicate  balancing  act. It must not be set too low, or queues will result. On
the other had, it must be set at a discount  from the parallel rate. The OGL can be set closer to the parallel
rate if there is simultaneous reduction in  the cost of using the OGL scheme, as  well as stricter
enforcement  of the rules designed  to prevent illegal activity. Many SSA countries are moving in this
- 27 -direction. For  example, Malawi and Zambia no  longer require  100 percent loca; coverage upo
application for OGL funds; Uganda recently eliminated  the requirement  of a letter of credit, reduced
processing delays in the official market and lowered  the threshold for preshipment  inspection.
An OGL also interacts with other mechanisms.  If the import lists under this scheme and the own-
funds window overlap, and if the OGL rate is persistently  overvalued, there will be excess demand in
the OGL for items that appear on both lists. In this case, only those firms that have access to the OGL
will benefit from the exchange rate subsidy.
5.3  Erporter Retention  Schemes
Compared  to OGL mechanisms,  retention  schemes  have proved to be less cumbersome  and to cause
less delay in the supply  of foreign  exchange.  In Zambia, for example,  getting exchange  from the retention
scheme currently requires four to seven working  days, while under the OGL it takes three to five weeks.
In general, they  have also proved more effective  in encouraging  exports  than other incentive  schemes  like
duty drawbacks  or rebates. This was the case in Kenya, where an export  compensation  scheme had been
operational since 1974 but, marred by frequent changes and delays, had benefitted  only a few large
exporters without encouraging exports on a broad base. One estimate of the benefits of a  foreign
exchange retention  scheme in Poland, where exchange restrictions  were severe, was quite high-up  to
8 percent of GDP (Tarr). P :. une size of the benefits depend on whether the retained earnings are
saleable, on the eligibility  criteria, and on the retention  ratios applied.
First, the benefits  are larger if the export proceeds  are saleable. This helps insure that the proceeds
over and above exporters' immnediate  needs are put to good use. It also increases  the scheme's incentive
effect for exporters. An export retention  scheme may not be effective in bringing illegal exports into
official channels when operated in conjunction  with an OGL or other official market with an overvalued
rate, if constraints exist on the uses of the retained proceeds. Exporters would in this case have the
- 28 -incentive to smuggle so as to obtain the parallel rate for their exports and at the same time effect their
imports  at the subsidized  official  OGL rate, thus benefitting  from the full parallel premium.
As  far  as  eligibility is  concemed, the main issue regards the treatmentc  of  traditional versus
nontraditional  exports. Many SSA countries have excluded traditional  exports from the scheme. These
include  Madagascar;  Tanzania, which abolished  the retention  allowance  for traditional  products in April
1989; and Uganda, where coffee was excluded  from the scheme.  Others have applied very low retention
ratios. In Ghana, for example, the retention  ratio for cocoa was only 5 percent. However, traditional
exports constitute the bulk of  most SSA country total exports, so that even the highest retention
percentages  would not supply  much  foreign  exchange  to the market if applied  only to nontraditionals.  The
significance  for foreign exchange  supply of a 100 percent retention  allowance  on non-coffee  exports in
Uganda, where coffee exports constitute  70 percent of the total, is clearly limited. Therefore, where
adequate funding of private markets for foreign exchange is a concern (as it generally is, especially in
later phases of the reforms), traditional  exporters  should be allowed  to participate  in the scheme, possibly
on equal termis.
Turning to the retention ratios. obviously  the higher the percentage, the greater the incentive  effect
on exports and the scope for enlargement  of the foreign exchange  market. In SSA countries, however,
the tendency has sometimes been to allow exporters to retain only slightly more foreign exchange than
needed for their imported inputs, so that retention ratios have been low, particularly for traditional
exports (5-35 percent in Ghana; 35 percent in Tanzania; 50 percent in Kenya and Zaire). This has been
motivated  partly by a desire to guarantee  that a certain amount  of foreign  exchange  is available  for official
purposes. In the initial stages of a  reform, the parallel premium could still be significant and the
government's fiscal constraints  may pose a serious barrier to its payment  of the full price for currency.
The imposition of even low retention ratios could in  this case constitute a  limited step  towards
- 29 -liberalization.  But the percentage should be expanded quickly, with the government purchasing its
requirements  in the market.
An important  consideration  is the interaction  of export retention  scheme  with bureaus and interbank
markets. Introducing a retention scheme without cwnstraints  on the uses of the funds is one way of
supplying  the private market for foreign  exchange.  This has happe  ned in Uganda  and since August 1992,
in Kenya when the introduction  of a  100 percent retention allowance on nontraditional  exports (later
extended to other categories)  brought about the development  of an extensive interbank  market, and in
Zambia, where since October 1992 the bureaus and the retention market have de facto  been fiflly
integrated.  In June 1993, Tanzania  altogether  abolished  the surrender requirement  to foster the expansion
of bureaus.
5.4  The  transition  to a floating regime: auctions  or interbank  markets?
Once a country is committed to adopt a floating regime, perhaps the most crucial issue becomes
whether it should move directly to an interbank  market or first implement  an auction system.
Much of the debate on the appropriateness  of interbank  versus auction  systems centers on the degree
of development of financial markets. Aron and Elbadawi (1993) suggest that an auction would be
preferable  as a further step in the transition  when  the institutional  setting is not developed  enough to allow
for the smooth functioning  of a decentralized  market. In such cases, an auction system strengthens  the
existing foreign exchange  market institutions,  give agents some time to learn how to function in a more
market-oriented  system, and thus prepare the ground for an eventual shift to a decentralized  system.
Another argument raised against interbank markets is that, if the number of commercial banks and
authorized  dealers is not sufficiently  high, it may be harder to prevent collusion  among  major players in
the market.
- 30 -While it is true that in an auction the central bank can strictly monitor and regulate  the behavior of
participjants.  there is in principle  no reason why it could  not intervene  in the interbank  market as well to
impose  regulations  preventing collusion,  for examnple,  by setting maximum  limits on the spread between
buying and selling rates. Alternatively,  it could  enforce the desired  spread by its own buying and selling
rates. Moreover, if  free entry for foreign exchange bureaus were allowed, competition should be
guaranteed  evetn  in an interbank  market.
Aron and Elbadawi  (1993)  suggest  that an auction's informational  content is richer than an interbank
system in that it conveys more precise and focused information  than that conveyed  merely  by the prices.
On the other hand, Quirk (1987) argues that, since the foreign exchange  is only partly surrendered  to the
market under an auction  system. less information  on the overall supply is available. And, from the point
of view of the government, (and donors - see section  5.6) an auction may be preferable  in that it allows
more direct monitoring  of the use of foreign  exchange  and ensure allocation  for development  priorities.
However, in many respects, an interbank system is superior to an auction.  First, auction systems
leave room for manipulation  by the authorities  through frequent ad hoc interventions.  This has clearly
been the case with Nigeria, where the central bank systematically  intervened  in the auction in order to
prevent excessive  depreciation  (section  5.5).i5 Manipulation  in the auction in Zambia in the mid-1980s
was more blatant, involving disqualification  of high bidders anai other direct interventions. Second,
auctions function discretely, which causes delays in the availability of foreign exchange and creates
uncertainty  for participants  engaged in both sales and purchases. Third, even well-run auctions impose
higher transaction  costs on participants  than a well-functioning  interbank market. Finally, the manner in
which auctions  in SSA  have been designed  in practice has prevented them from closely  mimicking  a true
exchange  market.  Particularly,  the pricing rules adopted  and the almost  total reliance on exchange  from
donors or state-owned  enterprises  to fund the auction has maintained  a segmented  market structure. And
- 31 -in Guinea, the mechanism  that was called an "auction"  actually  evolved into a system operated through
bids of quantity desired at a given price, with no price-adjustment  mechanism.
On balance, the problems with auctions argue that the move to an interbank market should be as
expeditious  as feasible. In some cases, it may be possible  to skip the auction altogether, as Gambia  has
done, apparently  quite successfully. This option should at least be seriously considered and specific
reasons identified  for rejecting it in cases where a transitional  auction is chosen instead. But in some
cases, for political or institutional  reasons, an auction may be necessary. The experience  with countries
like Ghana and Uganda shows that the auction can be very effective in reducing the parallel market
premium and in strengthening the intermediation  role of commercial  banks in the foreign exchange
system. After these two objectives  have been reached, though, the move to an interbank  market should
not be delayed, since  the shortcomings  potentially  implicit  in an auction system  are more likely  to emerge
with its prolonged  maintenance.
An intermediate  solution suggested by Feldman  and Mehra (1993) is the introduction  of a double
au-tion, that is, an auction in which both sellers and buyers submit  bids and in which price and quantity
exchanged  are determined  by matching  offers with demand bids. The advantage  of such a system would
be twofold:  on one hand, the functioning  of the auction would  be more transparent  since the government
would have less discretion in determining  the amount of foreign  exchange  to be auctioned;  on the other
hand, the double auction would be very similar to an interbank  market because  the private sector would
be involved  on both the supply and the demand sides. The difference  would  be, of course, in the discrete
rather than continuous  operation of the auction and in the different degree of institutional  comnplexity
required for the operation of the mechanism.  But, to date, this has not been tried.
- 32 -5.5  The design and management  offoreign exchange  auctions
Several issues arise in the design and management  of foreign exchange  auctions. Among the issues
most discussed in the literature is that of the pricing rule." 6 The main difference  between the Dutch and
the marginal  price system is that the former implies  price discrimination,  acting as a tax on inframarginal
bidders.  Different buyers pay different prices for the same commodity,  making this system a very
imperfect substitute for a free market. This acts as a tariff, albeit a highly variable one, introducing a
nontransparent and unpredictable method of taxing import consumption and protecting inefficient
production  of import  substitutes.  In another  major departure from the effects  of a free market, the surplus
related to the purchase of foreign exchange  accrues  to the government  in the form of revenue instead of
to infra-marginal  buyers in the form of profits. This may constitute  a major incentive  for the government
to use a Dutch auction.  But it also means  that efficient  users of foreign exchange  (who tend to be the
inframarginal  bidders) do not receive  the excess  profits that serve to attract investment  to the sectors and
companies  that can use the exchange  best. This compromises  the goal of efficient intertemporal  resource
allocation.
The Dutch system is sometimes claimed to be preferable for SSA countries  because it supposedly
discourages  strategic  bidding  and excessive  devaluation,  The argument  is that in a marginal  price auction,
bidders could bid higher than they are really willing  to pay, since  they know  that they will end up paying
only the marginal  rate. This reasoning  is what seems to have led to the adoption  of the Dutch  rule in most
SSA  countries. However, it is not at all clear this is really what should be expected  or what has happened
in practice. Some have argued that a Dutch auction would actually  be an incentive  to under-bid  and that
the "true" price would be more effectively  revealed  under a marginal price rule.'7
In any case, the experience of SSA countries that have adopted a Dutch system shows that the
marginal and the maximum rates rapidly tend to converge, so that the issue concerns more the early
stages of the auction than its regular operation. For example, in Uganda the spread between the highest
- 33 -and marginal  bids fell from USh 130 and USh 120 in the first and second sessions to USh 50 from the
fifth on, which represents  only about  0.5 percent  of the average exchange rate. There has clearly been
a learning process, which may or may not be related  to the use of a reserve  price (see below).
The imposition  of floor and ceiling  levels  on the acceptable  rates by the central bank may influence
the price course more than the institutional  rule of Dutch  versus  marginal  pricing itself. The reserve  price
is the minimun price at which the central  authority is ready to sell the foreign exchange.  McAfee and
McMillan (1987) suggest the use of a reserve price to counter collusive practices, but generally  it has
been used as a device to assure a "fair" or "true"  (in the view of the central  bank) pricing  of the scarce
foreign exchange. This estimate may be formed with reference  to a secondary  market. In Ghana, for
example,  the bureaus' rate has been used as an anchor  for the reserve  price. But sometimes,  the reserve
price has been set with little reference  to objective  market indicators.
Aron and Elbadawi  (1993) hypothesize  that wherever  a reserve  price has been set, even though not
announced,  it has contributed  to stabilizing  the auction  exchange  rate, since  bidders  have learnt the policy
rule implicit in the authorities' behavior. In the case of Uganda, participants  in the  auctions soon
understood  that the central bank set the floor price one or two shillings  above  the previous week's close,
and their bids converged  accordingly  (table 3.2). This was not without  shortcomings,  though. In all but
two sessions, the amount of successful  bids was lower than the amnount  of total bids, and only once (in
the third week) did supply act as a constraint:  in all the other cases some bids were excluded, mainly
because  they did not meet the reserve  price requirement.' 8 The resulting  underutilization  of auction  funds
suggests  the reserve  price may  have been set too high. Setting  a reserve  price may, in principle,  not only
lead to under-disbursement  of funds, but also to destabilization  of the parallel  premium, and an increase
in the average price of foreign  exchange  in both the auction  and parallel  markets  (section  4.3).
-34 -Table 3.2 Uganda: auction exchange rates, Shiligs
Week  Date  Average  Marginal  Highest  Lowest  Spread  Did
rate  rate  bid  bid  spread
Ist  01/31/92  1,039  970  1,100  970  130  130
2nd  02/07/92  1.037  980  1.100  900  120  200
3rd  02/14/92  1,025  990  1,050  970  60  80
4th  02/21/92  1.028  995  1,050  980  55  70
5th  02/28/92  1,029  1,000  1,050  985  50  65
6th  03/06/92  1,028  1,000  k  .050  1.000  50  50
7th  03/13/92  1,031  1.000  1,050  1,000  50  50
8th  03/20/92  1,027  1,000  1.050  1.000  50  50
No~tes:
1.  Difference  between  the highest  bid and the marginal  rate.
2.  Difference  between  the highest  and the lowest  bid.
Source: Robertson  (1992).  p.7 (from  Bank  of Uganda).
A second (opposite)  kind of price interventioni  is the imposition  of an upper ceiling on the auction
rate, with the aim of preventing an "excessive"  devaluation.  This was introduced  as aa explicit rule irn
the Zamnbian  auctions of March 1987, while it was indirectly  enforced by the central bank of Nigeria
through commercial  banks in the period 1986-89.  Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that central  bank officials
informally  exerted pressure on commnercial  banks in order to prevent them from bidding  too high. The
system of general rules goveming the auction indirectly reached the same goal. Limits were set on the
share of the total foreign  exchange  supplied  that could  be allocated  to each single  participant  discouraging
price competition  among  the banks and keeping  the bids low. Regardless  of how much  a bank was willing
to pay to obtain foreign exchange, it knew that it could obtain only a fraction of its needs, and that
fraction depended on its size rather than on its bids. Other regulations  haid the effect of restraining  the
demand at the auction and thus indirectly enforcing  a ceiling on the auction rate. The data reported in
Table 3.3 confirm  these conclusions:  despite the fact that demand constantly  outstripped  supply in 1987-
88, the de-reciation rate in the auction market remained low and the premium on the parallel market
remained  positive and significant.
- 35  -Table  3.3  Nigeria:  performance  of the auction
Excess
Month'  Forex  supply  Total  bids  demand  (USS  Auedon  Depreciation  Premiums
(USS  m)  m)  rate  rate  Parallel  rate'  (%)
01/87  50.00  55.41  5.41  3.4222  7.6923  124.77
02/87  75.00  94.04  19.04  3.9412  15.16  6.6666  69.15
03/87  50.00  38.39  -11.61  3.8241  -2.97  7.1428  86.78
04/87  80.00  102.18  22.18  3.7371  -2.27  6.2500  67.24
05/87  85.00  125.20  40.20  4.1619  11.37  5.555  33.48
06/87  100.00  150.00  50.00  4.3637  4.85  5.5555  27.31
07/87  70.00  78.84  8.84  3.98S9  8.57  6.6666  67.08
08/87  100.00  109.63  9.63  4.0405  1.27  6.2500  54.68
09/87  100.00  116.39  16.39  4.1918  3.74  5.0000  19.28
10/87  100.00  117.34  17.34  4.2533  1.47  4.7619  11.95
11/87  100.00  118.80  18.80  4.3432  2.11  4.3478  0.10
12/87  100.00  118.00  18.00  4.1916  -3.49  4.5454  8.44
01/88  100.00  117.00  17.00  4.1516  -0.95  5.0000  20.43
02/88  115.00  138.83  23.83  4.2342  1.99  5.0000  18.08
03/88  120.00  144.51  24.51  4.2910  1.34  5.5555  29.46
04/88  120.00  142.40  22.40  4.2121  -1.84  6.2500  48.38
05/88  120.00  145.77  25.77  4.1761  -0.85  6.6666  59.63
06/88  120.00  146.59  26.59  4.3132  3.28  6.2500  44.90
07/88  120.00  144.29  24.29  4.4750  3.75  6.6666  48.97
08/88  120.00  143.52  23.52  4.5455  1.57  7.1428  57.14
Notes:
1. Data  refer  to the first session  of the month.
2.  Since  data on the parallel  rate are only available  on an end-of-period  basis,  in order to make  them  comparable  with auction  rates
(which  relate  to the  first session  of the month),  we report  the end-of-period  January  figure  in the February  line.
3.  Calculated  as:  (Parallel  rate -auction  rate)/auction  rate.
Sources: Sobodu  and Sotonwa  (1992),  pp. 34-35;  World  Currency  Yearbook,  various  issues.
A second major issue in the design  of foreign exchange  auctions  is the nature of the participants.
In a retail  auction the participants  are  directly  importers  who demand  foreign  exchange for their own
needs. In a wholesale  auction, instead, the central  bank  sells foreign  exchange  to commercial  banks
- 36  -and authorized  dealers, who then sell onward to their clients. In practice, in both cases bids have been
submitted  by commercial  banks, the difference  being that while in the retail system banks can only
bid for the amount covered by importers' existing  orders, in the wholesale  system they can bid for
more and sell the remaining  part on the secondary  market. A somewhat  "hybrid" system has arisen in
the case of Uganda, where-despite the official  denomination  of "wholesale"  auction-commercial
banks only submit bids which exactly  cover their clients' requirements,  thus setting a defacto  retail
system. Banks  are reluctant  to bid on their own account, even though they can legally  do so, due to
the imposition  of a time limit on the utilization  of funds. The foreign  exchange  purchased  at the
auction must be utilized in three weeks, otherwise  it must be sold back to the central bank at the
marginal  rate less a 2.4 percent commission.  This induces  commercial  banks to merely pass on
importers' bids rather than bid for sale on the secondary  market.
There are least two reasons to allow wholesale  bidders rather than limiting  the participation  to
importers.  First, the transaction  costs involved  in a retail auction are high for small or occasional
importers, so that only importers  who require relatively large amounts  of foreign exchange would
actually participate  in the auction whether they are legally  excluded or not. Second, the adoption  of a
wholesale  auction would generally  contribute  to the development  of the financial  sector and to the
eventual establishment  of a competitive  market for foreign exchange. Of course, allowing wholesale
bidders is not inconsistent  with the inclusion  of retail bidders (with some minimum  quantity limit)  as
well.
In any case, whatever the type of auction, participation  should be allowed  on a fairly broad basis
in order to avoid a situation in which a few large banks (or importers)  dominate  the market. This
does not mean complete  absence of exclusionary  rules- it may in fact be prudent to exclude a bidder
wlhich  could dominate  or manipulate  the market. This was the case, for example, in Zambia, where
the mining company  (about 40 percent of the market) was allocated  foreign exchange  under a special
- 37 -arrangement. In Sierra Leone, the high degree of concentration  of the import and export sectors also
justified the adoption  of special rules.
A possible remedy for the danger of concentration  is to allow foreign exchange bureaus to bid in
the auction to increase competition. In Uganda, competition  has been de facto limited to the
commercial  banks, because foreign  exchange  bureaus are deterred by excessive  documentation
requirements.  Even in this case, however, the market is more competitive  than it would appear, since
the real bidders are the numerous importers, for whom the banks are only acting as agents.
Since bureaus are less closely regulated  by the central bank than are conmmercial  banks, the
inclusion  of bureaus may create problems  for the central bank in monitoring  the use of auction funds,
where this is necessary, for example, to satisfy donor requirements. There are, however, ways of
dealing with this (section  5.6). Another way of preventing  monopolization  could be the imposition  of
a maximum  limit on the size of the bids.
An important  requirement  for the management  of an auction market is transparency. In order to
build the confidence  of participants,  the rulks governing  the system should be unambiguous  and
disclosed.  The amount of foreign  exchange  to be auctioned  should be announced  in advance; the
opening  of the bids should be public and the number  of successful  bids should be announced
accordingly." 9 In case of disqualification  of any bids, the underlying reasons  should be publicly
communicated.
In some cases, when the above rules have not been observed the functioning  of the auction has
been compromised.  In Zambia, for example,  auction managers  had discretion in disqualifying  bids.
This led to manipulation  of the auction. In Ghana, instead, the comnmittee  that managed the auction
included representatives  from commercial  banks, so that any decision would  be known  by the whole
banking sector.
- 38-As with transparency, some guidelines  regarding  the frequency  of the auctions  should be
followed.  In principle,  auctions should be held on a regular basis rather than at unpredictable
intervals, so that their importance  in the foreign exchange  allocation  system is established.  Moreover,
they should be held often enough to reflect changes  in economic  conditions  and to prevent panic
bidding, without  at the same time becomning  so frequent  as to make the market "thin" or increase
administrative  costs prohibitively.  Although  Nigeria experumented  with daily auctions, in practice a
weekly frequency  seems to have been about right in most of the countries  that have tried it.
Last, but not least, when designing  and managing  an auction, participants  should not be
overloaded  with documentation  requirements. Excessive  paperwork and advance deposit requirements
impose  costs on bidders in terms of time and interest lost which discourage  the use of the auction.
One of the reasons for the underutilization  of auction funds in Uganda, for example, was the
requirement  that importers  should open letters of creditD  and have a 100 percent local cover when
the foreign exchange  was purchased. Where the funds were slow to be disbursed to winning bidders,
and especially  where interest rates were high (e.g., Zambia), the costs of the advance deposit
requirements  were even more onerous. Other documentation  requirements  may concem the uses of
the foreign exchange  purchased  through the auction. Documentation  requirements  impose  costs on
everyone but are especially  costly to small-scale  users.
5.6  The role of external  assistance in the transition  to a liberalized  regime
Donors' funds financed  virtually all OGL systems in SSA and constituted  the main source of
foreign exchange  for the auctions in Ghana, Uganda  and Zambia. 2"  It is therefore extremely
important  to address the issues of how external assistance  has been provided  so far and how it should
be provided in order to be consistent  with the aim of achieving  and sustaining  a liberalized  foreign
exchange  regime.
- 39 -So far, importers  who wanted  to get foreign exchange  from official sources have encountered
significant  documentation  requirements,  which are imposed  to give donors control over the allocation
of their funds. The stylized procedures  that an importer would follow can be summarized  as
follows:12
I)  The importer would complete  an application  to purchase  foreign currency and pass it to a
commercial  bank, together with a pro-forma  invoice (list of the goods to be shipped,
specifying  the price and the terms of sale) and the import license (if required).
2)  The importer would direct a commercial  bank to arrange payment to the exporter, typically  by
opening  a letter of credit. In Uganda, the commercial  bank charges 1 percent and the Central
Bank 2 percent for this.
3)  He would then obtain the foreign  exchange  through the relevant  sclieme  (OGL, auction or
other).
4)  On establishment  of the payment  mechanism,  the importer would proceed with shipment.
5)  The commercial  bank would pass all the documents  (application,  invoice, import license,
letter of credit) to the central bank, who would register the import and send copies of the
documents  to the Customs and to an institution  for a pre-shipment  inspection, to ascertain that
duties have been correctly applied and that prices are legitimate.A 3
6)  Following  the shipment, the commnercial  bank would pass the central bank documents
containing  evidence  of payment and shipping (that is, the final invoice, the bill of exchange,
the bankers' statement  of acceptance  of the letter of credit, and a clearance from the
surveillance  institution).
7)  The central bank would then pass the documentation  to the donors, who would check that the
transaction  has been carried out according  to the terms of agreement,  particularly as far as the
uses of the funds are concerned.34
8)  If the transaction  were satisfactory  on all checks, the donor agency  would reimburse the
amount by transferring funds to the central bank, who would  then use them in the auction,
OGL, or other scheme.
The above process is evidently  very costly: paperwork  costs add to commercial  bank fees at every
step, and the requirement  of local coverage for letters of credit (100 percent in the case of Uganda,
where the interest rate is 40 percent) adds further costs in terms of interest lost. Moreover, delays in
the execution  of the various controls  (such as the pre-shipment  inspection)  create uncertainty
regarding the time at which the foreign exchange  will be available  and discourage  the use of "official"
- 40 -channels compared to the bureaus or the parallel market.3 In Uganda, donor funds have not been
fully disbursed.
To help resolve these problems, donors need to simplify  documentation  requirements  and allow
their funds to be channeled  through other channels,  such as forcign exchange  bureaus. So far, the
World Bank and other bilateral donors have generally  funded auctions and OGL schemes26,  but as
the role of the secondary  market increases,  they should design procedures  to channel their funds
through foreign exchange bureaus and eventually  through the interbank  system. The simplification  of
import  procedures would allow even the bureaus to collect the essential documentation  from the
importers and deliver them to the central bank, where the documents  would be available for donor
inspection. This would of course break the link between  the donor funds and any specific import,
which should occur anyway, but still allow donors to verify that the kind of goods imported and the
terms of the transactions are in accordance  with the agreements.  Collier and Gunning report,
however, that Uganda's recent efforts to extend the paper trail requirements  to the bureaus as a
prelude to abolishing  the auction and creating  an interbank  market were seen by some as a precursor
to a return to rationing. As an alternative,  they recommend  using "Direction of Trade" statistics  on
exports from developed  countries to the recipient  countries. These are collected  on the exporting end
and are thus less likely to be distorted by evasion.  This would have the additional  advantage  of
virtually  eliminating  any paperwork  burden on importers  coming from donor demands.
There are still some donors who tie their import support by requiring that their funds  be used to
import particular categories  of goods, or that the imports  be from specified countries. The experience
of SSA countries  suggests that such :,ed aid has two negative  consequences.  First, it discourages  the
use of "official" funds compared to funds purchased  through the bureaus, which are usually subject
only to the restrictions inherent in the government's  prohibitive  list. Second, it shifts expenditures  to
- 41 -lower priority items. It is clearly desirable that donors remove such constraints  on the free use of
their support.
One final recommendation  is that donors supply funds on a more regular basis. The fact that the
flow of funds was not constant over time and the timing of disbursement  could not always be
predicted  with certainty (due, for example,  to bureaucratic  delays) has increased  the volatility of the
exchange  rate, which in turn has reflected  negatively  on the course of other prices. Moreover,
uncertainty  on the future availability  of foreign exchange  has induced enterprises  to carry larger
stocks of imported raw materials and intermediate  goods than would have been the case if foreign
exchange  had been channeled  more regularly  through the system. This has been a particular problem,
for example, in Uganda.
6.  Pattems of reform in SSA-review of experience'
The foreign  exchange allocation  mechanisms  previously  outlined have been introduced  in many
SSA countries in the 1980s  and early 1990s,  but only in a few have they fully achieved  the goals for
which they had been designed. A brief review of the experiences  of four countries is presented here
to indicate  how the various mechanisms  worked (or failed to work) as parts of a whole program of
foreign exchange  allocation reforms in some "successful"  and "unsuccessful"  cases.
Ghana is often considered  as the most successful  example of design and implementation  of trade
policy reform in SSA. Starting from a highly protectionist  regime and an exchange rate which had
remained  overvalued for years because the government  feared the political consequences  of a
devaluation,  the Cedi was devalued  seven times during 1983-85.  The first time in April 1983, this
was done through a system of import surcharges  and export bonuses,  then through discrete changes in
the official  parity, until a dual system was introduced  in September 1986. The first window  was
- 42 -administered  at the fixed official  rate and was used for official  debt service, imports of petroleum
products and surrender of traditional  export proceeds.  The second window  consisted  instead of a
weekly Dutch "retail" auction and was used to finance all other importers  licensed to bid at the
auction and to surrender nontraditional  export receipts. The dual system lasted only a few months,
since it was only a transitional  device to guarantee  the allocation  of foreign exchange  at a subsidized
rate for "priority" uses and to prepare the market  for a more extensive  use of the auction. The auction
then became  the only effective  window  in February 1987. Meanwhile,  an export retention  scheme
with multiple rates had been introduced  to guarantee  exporters  (mainly  nontraditional)  access to
foreign exchange  for their essential imports.
Although  a considerable  depreciation  had been achieved  since the beginning  of the reforms, the
parallel premium remained  on average 46 percent in 1987  and the existence  of a stUi  important  black
market for foreign exchange hampered  the efficient  functioning  of the auction. The government
subsequently  legalized  foreign exchange  bureaus in February 1988  and granted them eligibility  to bid
in the auction in December 1989. Exporters  were allowed  to sell their retained  earnings  to the
bureaus, instead of being obliged to hold them in accounts  abroad to finance  essential imports. These
and other changes brought the black market premium down  to 6 percent in 1990, a spread which
primarily reflected  transaction costs inherent in the operation  of the auction. These costs-and  this
spread-were  eliminated  first by replacing  the retail auction with a wholesale  one in which
commercial  banks -and not the central bank- were responsible  for determining  the eligibility  of
individual  bids, and then replacing  the auction itself with an interbank  market in March 1992. The
foreign  exchange system is now liberalized,  except for some controls remaining  on capital outflows,
and the parallel market premium has been virtually  eliminated:  Ghana can therefore be judged to have
a virtually convertible  currency.
- 43 -Uganda had experimented  with auctions  beginning  in 1982, but at that time the coverage of
auction funds on the demand  and supply side was extremely  limited and all kinds of controls on
foreign exchange allocation  remained  in place. So the first stage of the liberalization  process can
actually be traced to the 1987  Economic  Recovery  Program. As in the case of Ghana, at the
beginning the main ingredient  in the reform package was a set of devaluations  (between  May 1987
and December 1989)  aimed at avoiding  a growing appreciation  of the exchange rate in the presence of
annual inflation  rates above 100  percent.
An OGL system was introduced  in November  1987, and an export retention  scheme for
nontraditional  agricultural  exports one year later, together with the so-called Special Import Program
(SIP). 2 The export retention  scheme was very effective in enhancing  export performance,  especially
because it was accompanied  by deregulation  in the markets of nontraditional  exports. The OGL and
SIP schemes  did not prove to be very successful,  so from 1989 the World Bank and the IMF pressed
for the adoption  of further liberalization  measures. Although  in principle an auction system could
have been introduced  first, the government  believed  the legalization  of foreign exchange  bureaus
would be more likely to succeed, since it would merely recognize  structures  which were already
existing on the black market, rather than creating  new structures  and new markets. The bureaus were
thus legalized in June 1990, and soon absorbed a significant  amount  of foreign  exchange transactions.
The next step, the unification  of the exchange  rate, was taken in January 1992 with the introduction
of a weekly Dutch auction in which commercial  banks and bureaus were allowed to participate.'
The auction was funded by donors. But the demand for foreign exchange was less than expected  and
the auction funds were in general not fully utilized (Table 3.4), for several reasons. These included
the reserve pricing rule, the higher administrative  costs of using the auction, and the relative difficulty
of tax evasion when using the auction.?
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Week  Date  Forse supplied  Total  bids  Successl  bids  Ud&wu  Rate
Ist  01/31/92  5,000,000  2,482,978  2,287.844  45.8%
2nd  02/07/92  2,500,000  2,461,218  1,412,318  56.5%
3rd  02/14/92  2,500,000  3,051,863  2,499,999  100.0%
4th  02/21/92  3.500,000  3,557,839  3,335,278  95.3%
5th  02/28/92  4,000,000  1,927,323  1,919,412  48.0%
6th  03/06/92  3,500,000  3,239,794  3,239,794  92.6%
7th  03/13/92  2,500.000  1,503,586  1,256.380  50.3%
8th  03/20/92  4,000,000  3,711,931  3,388,116  84.7%
Total  27,500.000  21,936,532  19,339,141
Average  3,437,500  2,742,067  2,417,393  70.3%
As of September 1993, the system has functioned  smoothly  and has led to a consistent  reduction
in the spread on the parallel rate. However, to resolve remaining  problems  and move closer to a true
market mechanism,  the proposal is currently being considered  of shifting to an interbank  market,
provided that donor funds can be channeled  this way.
More controversial  and certainly less successful  with trade liberalization  has been the experience
of  Nigeria. In the early 1980s  the Nigerian  government  maintained  a fixed overvalued  exchange rate
and allocated foreign exchange  (derived primarily from oil exports) through a highly discretionary
administrative  import licensing  system. The growing importance  of the parallel market (the premium
was around 400 percent for the period 1983-85)  and other macroeconomic  imbalances  induced the
government  of General Babangida  to launch  an adjustment  program in 1986. After a series of discrete
devaluations  beginning in January 1986, a dual rate regime was introduced  in September 1986. The
first window  consisted  of a crawling  peg against the US dollar and was used for debt service and
- 45  -official imports, all other legitimate  current account transactions  being financed  in the second
window, where the exchange rate was determined  at a weekly  wholesale  auction. The pricing rule was
an average-bid  one in the first two sessions, became  a marginal  price one from the third on, and was
finally changed into a Dutch rule in April 1987. The latter rule was introduced  by the central bank in
an attempt to moderate the dexcessive"  rate of depreciation which had occurred in the first months: it
was hoped that the Dutch rule wvould  restrain the banks' desire to bid high. 3'
Excess demand remained, though, so that the scarce foreign  exchange was actually allocated
according  to a series of rules which were much  closer to an administrative  system than to a market
one.3A  Regulatory intervention  was extensive  in the secondary  market as well. Banks were allowed  to
sell auction funds to the interbank market, but in principle  only at a 1 percent margin. Given the
rationing  of funds, there was scope for a high black market prenium to persist in the sales to final
importers, creating enormous rents for banks who were allocated  exchange  in the "auction."
The two windows  of the dual system were unified  under the auction in July 1987, until a managed
system was introduced  in January 1989, wherein  the exchange rate was discretionarily  determined  by
the central bank in loose accordance  with five predetermined  criteria. The degree of transparency  in
the exchange  rate determination  was thus reduced further, adding  to the already existing
administrative  complexity  of the allocation  according  to size. Under IMF pressure, the govermnent
reinstated  a Dutch auction in December 1990. To protect future financial rents, commercial  banks
lobbied successfully  for tough capital requirements  and regulations  on the creation of new banks and
to keep the bureaus outside of the interbank  market.
In March 1992, the auction was discontinued  and the exchange  rate was allowed to be determined
on the interbank  market. The purpose of this change was to abolish  the still high parallel premium,
but the central bank was not willing to accept the rate of depreciation  resulting from the system and
intervened  to defend the Naira by meeting  all the demands  for foreign exchange  at an exchange rate it
- 46 -considered  appropriate. The result was a drop in international  reserves from US$ 4 billion in March
1992  to US$ I billion at the end of the year, which induced  the central bank to suspend  the supply of
foreign exchange  for six weeks from December 1992  to March 1993. At that date the central bank
announced  that it would supply a fixed quantity of exchange  every week at a pre-determined  exchange
rate; the quantity allocated to each bank would be a function  of its Naira deposits at the central bank.
The new system was designed to absorb liquidity  and stop the currency depreciation  through monetary
contraction, a result that it actually achieved.  At the same time, though, it touched off a process of
financial  disintermediation  and distorted the incentives  for the banking system. Rents accruing to
banks from selling foreign exchange  were higher than the returns on real project lending. Many
distressed banks opened rural branches in order to increase deposits and reserves at the cental bank
and be allocated larger amounts  of foreign exchange. The resources  mobilized in this way would have
otherwise  been available for investment  and growth.
The Nigerian system cannot be said to be close to convertibility,  nor it can be said to have
achieved  efficiency  and transparency in the allocation  of foreign exchange. A significant  premium on
the parallel market remains azid  p--:sisting  excess demand  - together with the political unwillingness  to
let the currency depreciate above a certain threshold  - requires administrative  rationing at the bank
level. No effective  step towards a market-based  allocation  regime can be envisaged  unless the
exchange  rate is allowed  to play the role of clearing the market through devaluation.
Another example  of a "troubled"  foreign  exchange  system is that of Zambia. After experimenting
with a pegged  exchange rate and a system of adminisative  controls  on the allocation  of foreign
exchange in the 1970s  and early 1980s,  Zambia  first introduced  an auction in October 1985. Such
auctions, held on a weekly  basis and conducted  according to the marginal  pricing rule (Dutch from
March 1987), allocated  donor funds and surrendered  export receipts to authorized  banks. The auction
rate also set the price for those foreign exchange  transacdons  which took place outside the auction
-47  -market, e.g., debt service, direct transactions  of the government  and of the Zambia  Consolidated
Copper Mines (ZCCM), and oil imports.  The exchange rate initially  depreciated  and the parallel
premium fell, but these trends were soon reversed  as the government  imroduced  a number of
measures to discourage  high bids and in general the demand for auction funds. Such measures
included  imposition  of severe documentation  requirements;  institution  of a deposit requirement  of 30
percent (40 percent from March 1987)  as pre-condition  for participating  in the auction;
disqualification  of high bids; publication  of the names of high bidders in order to question their
patriotism; and finally the appointment  as governor of the central bank of Dr. Chivuno, who was one
of the major opponents  to the auction.
Some external factors (namely the decline in copper prices and the insufficient  support from donor
agencies), together with the failure of macroeconomic  stabilization  (which  put the exchange  rate under
speculative  pressure) and with internal  political problems  (the riots which followed  the decontrol of
maize prices in December 1986), led to a suspension  of the auction from January to March 1987 and
to its final abandonment  in May. The exchange  rate was then fixed and the administration  of exchange
and import licenses  was given to a Foreign Exchange  Management  Committee  (FEMAC).  The first
reform attempt had thus come to an end.
The dialogue with the World Bank and the IMF was later re-opened  and in February 1990  a dual
exchange  system was introduced. In the first window, receipts from mining and parastatals  funded
official imports  and debt service at a rate which was pegged to the SDR. The second window,
instead, was operated on an OGL basis with donor fimds and applied to a positive list of imports. The
exchange rate in this window  was still set by the government,  but adjusted frequently  to balance
demand and supply. As more foreign exchange  became  available, more imports were transferred to
the second window, unEil  the first was abolished  in April 1991. The parallel  premium was still
significant,  due to persisting  excess demand for foreign exchange. To address this and other
- 48 -problems, such as the delays and cumbersome  procedures  of the OGL scheme, a Bureaux  de Change
system was instituted  in October 1992. Two months later the official  and the bureau rate were unified
at the latter rate.
The Zarnbian experience  is a study in contrast. Compared  to the initial reversals  and failures in
reform, Zambia has lately made substantial  progress in liberalizing  the market for foreign
exchange. 33 To some extent, the recent progress  has been facilitated  by the fact that the new political
regime (since 1992)  was not closely  tied to past policies. Nonetheless,  although  the price of foreign
exchange is currently market-determined,  the bulk of foreign exchange  is still allocated  by
administrative  fiat (namely, debt service, ZCCM and government  transactions, imports  under the
OGL scheme). Further movement  towards  market allocation is needed, but this is impeded  by the
large role on both the supply and demand  side played by ZCCM.
Many other SSA countries provide  useful examples  of patterns of reform of the foreign  exchange
system, both successful  and unsuccessful.  In The  Gambia, an interbank  market has operated smoothly
since 1986  together with an OGL system, and the currency can now be said to be fully convertible.
Kenya has implemented  an export retention  scheme  and allowed an interbank  market for retained
fundf since August 1991, though not without  considerable  interference.  In May 1993  a wholesale
auction was introduced with the aim of stabilizing  the exchange  rate, but it has tumed out to be a
device for providing cheap foreign exchange  to politically  influential  banks. Other countries, like
Madagascar  (where an OGL scheme had been in place since 1987)  have seen their reform attempts
falter in the face of internal political turmoil. And in some, only recently have serious reforms gotten
underway. Ethiopia  just began its auction in August 1993. The overall picture of SSA seems that of a
region in which structural imbalances,  political problems,  and in some cases warfare have obstructed
liberalization  of the foreign exchange  systems, as they have obstructed other reforms.  Most countries
seem to be moving in the right direction, but still have a long way to go.
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Theory and experience with exchange  allocation  mechanism  reforms can be synthesized  to yield a
number of lessons. Some of these are relevant  to the design and operation of specific mechanisms,
others to the reform process in general. This section  discusses  the general lessons  first, moving  then
to the specific.
First, given its importance  in determining  the relative incentive  structure, and particularly its
redundant  role in increasing  anti-export  bias, reform of the exchange  regimes should continue  to be
given highest  priority in the reform programs of most SSA countries. Likewise, the failure to
successfully  make the transition to a market allocation  (i.e., a virtually convertible  currency at least
for current account transactions)  has been, and is, a major shortcoming  of most adjustmnent  packages.
Only a few SSA countries (the Gambia, Ghana and Mauritius)  have made this transition. The key to a
successful  and sustainable  transition lies largely in the consistency  of the overall reform package and
the careful design of each part.
Second, there seems to be no general prescription regarding  the appropriate  speed of the
transition. Ghana phased the transition  over almost a decade, with many intermediate  steps, using
many of the transitional  mechanisms.  Uganda  has moved faster, and is perhaps close to completing
the transition, but like Ghana used several mechaniems,  including  an auction. The Gambia  moved
quite rapidly to an interbank  market with no intermediate  steps, and thus to virtual current account
convertibility.  Given the problems  of all intermediate  steps (including  auctions),  a rapid transition is
preferred on purely economic  grounds, but this may not always be feasible  due to political  or
institutional  constraints.
Third, the success  of exchange  rate reforms is jeopardized  by failure of macroeconomic
discipline. This implies that the transition must be accompanied  by stringency in fiscal and monetary
- 50 -policy and also by a willingness  to allow the exchange  rate to seek a true market-clearing  level. When
the political sensitivity  of devaluation  impedes  this process, even a mechanism  with endogenous  price-
setting (e.g., auction) can degenerate  into an administrative  allocation  mechanism,  as occurred in
Nigeria. Ghana and Uganda have exercised control over public expenditure  and monetary expansion
and have been willing to allow appropriate  devaluations;  Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia (at least
until recently) have not. This goes a long way in explaining  the success  of the first group and the
reversals in the second.
Fourth, the movement  to a true unified free market for exchange  would be greatly facilitated  by
some changes in donor practices. These would be aimed at "untying"  aid, making  disbursements  more
regular, and simplifying  documentation  requirements  for disbursement,  so exchange  can be channeled
through private sellers of exchange.
Among the specific transition mechanisms,  probably  the most rudimentary  is the own-funds
scheme. It may be useful as an initial step toward reform when distortions  are severe, since it is
simple, imposes little administrative  burden, and is almost certain to have some salutary effects. Its
value is largely determined  by comprehensiveness  of the list of eligible  goods. If the scheme is
restrictive (and particularly if it does not include consumer  goods  that compete  with domestic
production), it will be administratively  more complex  and will have less potential for reducing
protection.  The list should be as inclusive  as possible, preferably all-inclusive.  In this case, there will
be an automatic incentive  to import goods that are in the shortest supply, as indicated  by the
difference  between  their border prices and domestic  prices. Also, own-funds  schemes  should be
accompanied  by some liberalization  of the rules governing  exports; otherwise,  the extra incentive
from the own-funds  schemes  may increase illegal  exports and the black market premium. At any rate,
the own-funds  scheme is no more than a beginning  of reform, since it does not attack the fundamental
problems  and the system continues  to confer non-transparent  (and usually high) protection.
- 51 -Export retention  schemes  have several potential functions.  One is to minimize  the adverse effects
of foreign exchange  shortages  on exporters' ability to import necessary  inputs. For this. the retained
funds need not be saleable. The other two functions  are to partially remove  the implicit  export tax (by
allowing  exporters to sell exchange  at a better price than the official  rate) and to fund a legal prvate
exchange  market. To accomplish  these, the retained funds must be saleable,  the retention  rates
substantial,  and especially  to adequately  meet the last goal, traditional  exports should be included.
Open General Licensing  (and similar) schemes  have been used in most adjusting SSA countries. In
principle, they can be a useful intermediate  step in simultaneously  liberalizing  the import and
exchange  allocation regimes. In practice, some have been neither very open nor very general. One
problem is that the goods whose imports were restricted  the most (e.g., consumer  goods that compete
with domestic production)  have usually  been excluded, at least in the initial stages. This implies that
the early stages actually increased  effective  protection. Another problem  has been that the OGL has
no endogenous  price-setting  mechanism  for the exchange  rate. Consequently,  the rate often has been
set at an overly appreciated  level, leading  to chronic shortages  and rationing, which was the problem
meant to be resolved.  To avoid  this, the OGL rate should generally  be connected  to, but lower than,
the parallel rate.
As a step toward establishing  a true market allocation mechanism,  a well-functioning  auction has
significant  advantages  over these other mechanisms.  Perhaps the most important  is that, in addition to
its allocation function,  it incorporates  a pricing mechanism  as well. The most important  lesson of
experience  is that the pricing mechanism  must be allowed  to work without  interference;  otherwise, the
auction may degenerate  into another mechanism  for non-transparent,  administrative  allocation of
exch.ange.  Other lessons  relate to the auction's design. in principle, the auction should use a marginal
pricing rule to more clearly approximnate  the intertemporal  effects of a free market. The auction rules
should be clear (e.g., not allow discretionary  dis-qualification  of bids), should minimize  costs of
- 52 -auction participants. and should allow wide participation  by type of product  and type of bidder. As
experience in Nigeria indicates. multiple  bids for the same import should not generally  be allowed
since they artificially  inflate demand  and reduce the information  value of excess demand  as an
indicator  of shortage  or inappropriateness  of the auction price. The use of a reservation  price in an
auction is controversial.  While it may reduce volatility, it may also impede  the full disbursement  of
funds.
Of course, all of these design issues  become more important  the longer the "transitional"  schemes
are left in place. The danger that poor design may compromise  the goal of the reform is a strong
argument for moving as rapidly as possible to full convertibility,  at least for current account
transactions.
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Pn#tm of refom  Saimry  tabk
Auction  Inter.bank  Bureau  de  change  Etport  retention  OGL  Ownints
The  Gambia  1986-  1990-  1986
Ghana  1986-92  1992-  1988-92  1986-
Guinea  1986-  1980s
Kenya  1993-  1992-  1992
Madagascar  1985-91  1987-91
Nigeria  1986-89  1986-93  1989-  1986  1980-84
1990-92
Somalia  1986-87  1985-87  !985-  1980-81
1990-  1988-
Tanzania  1992-  1986-  1988-  1984-
Uganda  1982-86  1990-  1988-  1987-92  1987-
Zaire  1983-  1991-  1983-
Zambia  1985-87  1983-  1990-  1980s
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1. Two caveats  are in order. First, when talking about "Sub-Saharan  Africa" we will generally  exclude
the CFA Franc zone, since countries  belonging  to this area pursue a particular  foreign exch4ge policy
and have traditionally  benefitted  from full convertibility  with respect to the French franc. Second, only
foreign exchange controls and restrictions related to  current account transactions will be explicitly
considered, since most SSA countries  still maintain  restrictions  on the capital account, and the issues  of
capital account convertibility  are somewhat  different from those of trade policy liberalization,  which is
the focus of this paper.
2.  For a comprehensive  review  of "exotic  exchange  rate arrangements"  see Dornbusch  (1984). For the
purpose of this paper, a multiple  rate structure  can be described  as one in which the authorities  buy and
sell foreign exchange at different official rates according to the kind of transaction. Even when the
exchange  rate is officially  unified,  multiple  rates (in the  Intermational  Monetary  Fund definition)  may arise
with the introduction  of export bonuses  or import deposit  schemes.
3. Other ways of taxing exports were also used, including  explicit  export taxes, quantitative  restrictions
and parastatal control of export channels.
4. Gulhati et al. (1986), p.416.
J.  In some cases the license may not even be required, while in others it may be granted on  a
discretionray  basis rather than automatically,  and limits  may be imposed  on the overall quantity  and price
of the goods imported.
6. Auctions in which the bidder indicates  both the price and the quantity are defined in the literaure as
"multi-unit"  auctions  (see Feldman  and Mehra). In the experience  of SSA, the detail of the composite  bids
presented varies from country  to country. In Uganda, for examnple,  each commercial  bank aggregates  all
the importers' requests at a given price and submits a single bid for that price; in Zambia, banks were
required to submit separate bids for different uses, even if the price offered was the same.
7. In the case of a Dutch auction. both the marginal  price and a (weighted)  average of successful bids
could be used. Among the countries which have used auction systems in SSA, three shifted from a
marginal  price to a Dutch rule (Nigeria, Uganda,  Zambia),  one adopted  the Dutch  system from the outset
(Ghana) and one chose a marginal  price rule (Guinea).
8. Although  in what follows  we will not distinguish  between  the two kinds  of bureaus, a legalized  bureaus
market usually consists both of independent  foreign exchange  bureaus and of bureaus that have been
established as arms of commercial  banks.
9.  The analysis  is similar for an auction operating  alongside  a parallel market. In the case of the auction,
the issue is how the reservation  price in the auction  can be set, rather than how to get the "official' OGL
rate in the discussion  here.
10. Bagachwa,  et al. (1990)  find evidence  of substantial  parallel  market activities  for agricultural,  hunting
and mining products, as well as for tourism and housing  services.
- 55 -11. Bagachwa  et al. (1990).
12. The nonrefundable  application  fee (a), coupled  with the average prorated demand share fulfilled  at
each LIR session (s), drove a wedge between the official (E.) and the effective (E,) exchange rate as
follows: E, =  (I +a/s)E 0 .
13. The exchange  rate rule was the following:  whenever  the divergence  (EIE 0-1) exceeded  25% for two
consecutive months, the official exchange rate was devalued by the percentage difference, less the
application  fee. This rule, together  with the (initial)  application  fee of 10%, implied  a low threshold for
devaluation  (i.e. s =0.4).
14. In the case of Zambia, for example,  it was announced  that all foreign  exchange  allocations  under the
OGL were to be made "at the rate determined  by the Bank of Zambia on the basis of the exchange  rates
quoted by the bureaus de change  for the US dollar, without  providing  for any discount"  (facsimile  dated
June 9, 1993  on the subject of the modified  OGL system).
15. The high degree of intervention  of the central  bank of Nigeria is related  to the fact that auction funds
come almost totally from exports of a state-owned  resource (i.e., oil). In other countries, the presence
of donors' funds as the main source of foreign exchange  helped administer  the auction in a regular and
transparent way.
16. See, among the others, Krumm (1985), Takacs (1987), Aron and Elabadawi  (1993).
17. Takacs (1987), p.15.
18. In some cases the cause of exclusion  was insufficient  cover: commercial  banks were in fact required
to maintain balances in their clearing accounts  with the Bank of Uganda  sufficient to cover the amount
bid at the time of the auction.
19. The publication  of the bids in a detailed form (listing the importers  or the banks with the relative
prices. quantities  and uses) could have contrasting  effects: on one hand, it would increase transparency
and build confidence; on the other it might encourage collusion among the bidders. While such a
publication  occurred in the case of Zambia (and partially of Uganda), it did not in Ghana and Nigeria.
20. A letter of credit is issued by the bank  as a proof of local currency coverage.
21. In the case of Nigeria, virtually the entire pool of foreign exchange  for the auction came from oil
receipts. Other foreign exchange  allocation  schemes, like export retention or own funds, have instead
been funded mainly by private earnings.
22. The procedures  described in the text actually  relate to disbursement  of ODA funds to Uganda. The
kind of requirements  and the order of magnitude  of the costs are similar in other countries.
23. The pre-shipment  inspection  often applies only to imports whose  value is above a certain threshold
(for example, US$ 5,000 in the Ugandan case), but most recent proposals  by the World Bank and other
agencies suggest reducing the threshold  in order to better enforce Customs  controls.
24. This in turn would mean checking  that the imported goods  are on the agreed positive list (or are not
on the agreed negative  list) and that the exporting  country is the correct one (if funds are "tied").
- 56 -25. Robertson (1992) has estimated  the costs associated  with the use of auction funds in Uganda for an
import of US$ 25,000 at an auction exchange  rate of USh 1,031/US$.  Taking into account  commissions
from the central and commercial banks, interest charges, pro-forma invoices and the pre-shipment
inspection, the cost of the import increased  from USh 25,775,000  to USh 29,472,085 (that is, 14.3% of
the initial value).
26. Even auction systems have sometimes  faced difficulties  in being accepted  by the donors. In the case
of Uganda, for example, the European  Community  did not accept the retroactive  financing implied  by
an auction system for its first Structural  Adjustment  Program (SAP). It did accept it for the second SAP
in 1992.
27. A detailed analysis of each country's foreign exchange  policy goes beyond the scope of this study.
The Annex shows the timing of the use of several transition mechanisms  in a number  of SSA countries.
28. Under the SIP foreign exchange was allocated to eligible categories of imports under a first-come
first-served  basis; the exchange  rate applied  was the same as for the OGL, but the system was more open
and general.
29. Foreign exchange  bureaus were nominally  allowed to bid in the auction, but procedural requirements
(as the opening  of letters of credit) effectively  precluded them from submitting  bids.
30. As shown in Table 3.3. the average utilization  rate in the first eight sessions of the auction was
70.3%, with rates below 50% in the first and fifth sessions. Besides the shortcomings  of the auction
system per se,  one of the reasons for the underutilization  of auction funds in the first stages was that
under the OGL and SIP programs (which provided foreign exchange  on an irregular and unpredictable
basis) importers had stored high levels of inventories,  and needed  to run down these inventories  during
the auction regime (which represented  a more certain source of funds).
31. A complementary  measure  designed  to curb the demand for foreign exchange  in the auction  was the
change in its periodicity from weekly  to fortnightly  in the same month.
32. In particular, the available  supply was distributed in prorated shares among successful  bidders, the
shares depending  on both bank size (defined  by their asset base) and the amount  bid. "Large" banks were
awarded a maximum of 5 % of the total supply of foreign exchange, while for "medium" and "small"
banks the percentages  were, respectively,  2% and 1.5%.
33. As  of  September 1993, the FEMAC has been abolished, the export retention scheme allows
nontraditional  exporters  to retain 100%  of their proceeds,  a short negative  list for imports  exists, and the
OGL scheme finances  about 30% of total imports  (but 95% of them are eligible for the scheme).
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